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On January 1, 1990, the Hungarian Constitutional Court became the first
institution created by Hungary's new Constitution to assume its responsi-
bilities.' The birth of a constitutional court can generate a complex set of
problems in any society. A government must build public acceptance of, and
support for, the institution and create an effective structure for its activities.
A whole new set of problems arises when a constitutional court begins its
work in a time of transition from an undemocratic state to a state based on the
rule of law. This paper discusses some of the problems encountered by
Hungary as well as Hungary's attempts to solve them.
I. CONTINUITY AND A NEW START
The new Hungarian Constitution went into effect on October 23, 1989.2
The first five judges of the Constitutional Court were elected by Parliament
in November 1989; the first free parliamentary elections followed in April
1990.1 Because the Court was established before the elections, it was able to
oversee events until the new government took office and issue opinions on the
new election law and on the President's legal standing.4 The existence of the
Constitutional Court during the transition thus allowed the transformation of
political problems into legal questions that could be addressed with final,
binding decisions. Furthermore, it gave the Court an opportunity to demon-
strate its political independence and, thus, the possibility of separation of
powers between governmental branches.
t President, Hungarian Constitutional Court.
1. 1989 6vi XXXII t6rvdny az AlkotmAnybfr6sigr6l [Law No. 32 of 1989 on the Constitutional
Court], 1989/77 Magyar K6zl6ny [Official Gazette] [hereinafter MK.] 1283 (Hung.) (unofficial translation
on file with author) [hereinafter Law No. 32].
2. Law No. 31 of 1989 on the Amendment of the Constitution. The author assumes responsibility for
the accuracy of untranslated sources.
3. The two rounds of the parliamentary elections took place on March 25 and April 8, 1990. Parlia-
ment appointed five more judges after taking office. Another five judges will be appointed in 1995. Ethan
Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary 's Transitionfrom Conmunism to Democracy: The Constitutional
Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 41, 89.
4. The Court reviewed the new election law in Judgment of Feb. 18, 1990, 1990/2 Alkotmnybfr6sdgi
HatArozatok [Decisions of the Constitutional Court] [hereinafter ABH.] 18; Judgment of Mar. 4, 1990,
1990/3 ABH. 25; Judgment of Apr. 23, 1990, 1990/7 ABH. 40.
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The Constitutional Court has played a major role in "harmonizing" pre-
constitutional norms with the Constitution through a process of abstract
judicial review. The new Constitution did not automatically suspend pre-
existing laws. Instead, it required Parliament to review all pre-constitutional
laws and regulations to insure that they would be consistent with the newly
established Constitution. In the process, such old laws acquired validity in the
new system.5 Parliament is now reformulating regulations in nearly all areas
of government. Abstract judicial review, provided for in the Court's
implementing legislation, the Law Concerning the Constitutional Court (LCC),
permits anyone to lodge an application challenging the constitutional validity
of an enacted law or regulation, regardless of whether that person has been
affected by the challenged regulation.6 This review has been the chief activity
of the Court since its establishment.7 Because motions for abstract judicial
review determine which questions of law the Court can review, however, the
Court cannot coordinate its judicial review with Parliament's harmonization
efforts. At most, the Court can delay the effective date of the annulment of
a provision so that Parliament can promulgate a new law.
In addition to its use of abstract judicial review, the Court has been
heavily involved in reviewing legislation pertaining to basic rights. Under the
new Constitution, any rules that "relate to a basic right" must be specified by
an act of Parliament.' This provision of the Constitution immediately
generated a number of challenges to laws issued under the old legal order that
affect fundamental rights.9 Were the Court to adopt a practice of striking
down old laws and regulations that conflict with the Constitution in this
formalistic sense, it would be forced to strike down the vast majority of pre-
constitutional laws. Consequently, the Court generally has invalidated only
those laws and regulations that conflict with the Constitution in substance.
5. See Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77, 83 (unofficial translation on file with author)
("The politically revolutionary changes adopted by the Constitution and the fundamental laws were all
enacted in a procedurally impeccable manner, in full compliance with the old legal system's regulations
of the power to legislate, thereby gaining their binding force.*).
6. Law No. 32, supra note 1, art. 21(2). The LCC sets forth three major types of review:
(1) review of proposed legislation and regulations for constitutional infirmities, (2)
interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions (advisory opinions), and (3) review
of enacted legislation and regulations, as well as actions and omissions, for constitutional
infirmities.
Klingsberg, supra note 3, at 55-56.
7. In 1990, 259 out of the Court's 311 decisions referred to the abstract review of constitutionality;
in 1991, 199 decisions out of 258; in 1992, 64 out of 110.
8. A MAGYAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 8(2) (Hung.) ("In the Republic of
Hungary, an Act shall determine the rules on fundamental rights and obligations, however, it shall not
limit the essential contents of fundamental rights."); Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. 293, 300
(unofficial translation on file with author) ("However, not every kind of relationship calls for statutory
regulation. Such regulation is required for any direct and significant restriction of basic rights while, in
some cases, the determination of content of basic rights and the manner of their protection also calls for
statutory measures. However, where the relationship with basic rights is indirect and remote,
administrative regulation is sufficient; if it were otherwise, everything would have to be regulated by
statutes.").
9. E.g., Judgment of Nov. 8, 1991, 1991/58 ABH. 288, 289-90.
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Some observers, contending that the old legal norms caused many of the
new regime's social problems, have criticized this piecemeal, gradual
reorganization of the Hungarian legal order; they would dispense with the
entire old legal order. The Constitutional Court has itself been criticized
because of its support for legal continuity. Its response to pressures for a
speedy transition from the old system to a new one has therefore been a
critical issue in Hungary.
I1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
IN T=E NEw SYSTEM
Although the Constitution defines the scope of the authority of the Court
and guarantees the independence of its judges, determining its position in the
structure of the newly created constitutional state - that is, its relation to the
other organs of the state - has raised fundamental issues of constitutional
interpretation.
A. Parliament
Parliament has found, to some dismay, that its powers are limited by the
Constitutional Court's oversight. Since the legislature under socialism had
unlimited sovereignty, it is understandable that some members of Parliament
would have difficulty accepting the existence of a Constitutional Court. The
Court has been able to withstand their political attacks by responding with the
legitimizing force of constitutional analysis.
On the other hand, political parties have tried to use the process of pre-
enactment review to their advantage in parliamentary debate. 10 A premature
review could, of course, determine the future course of debate. In order to
minimize any interference with parliamentary processes, the Court has refused
pre-enactment review of draft legislation if numerous petitions for modifica-
tion of the draft are still pending. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with
the Constitutional Court's role, which is that of a judge of legislation, rather
than an advisor to legislators.
The Court has taken a similar approach with regard to its authority for
"abstract constitutional interpretation."" It has denied petitions for review
that would require it to assume functions more properly carried out by other
branches of government. For example, the Court rejected a Ministry of
Finance petition that would have required the Court to analyze and evaluate
several economic models. The Court set strict preconditions for justiciability
10. The Court can review a draft law to assess its constitutionality at the request of Parliament, a
parliamentary committee, or a group of fifty representatives. Law No. 32, supra note 1, arts. 1(a), 21(1).
The President of the Republic and the cabinet is also entitled to ask for pre-enactment review. Judgment
of Apr. 23, 1991, 1991/16 ABH. 58, 58-61.
11. See Law No. 32, supra note 1, art. 51.
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and made clear that it would not accept the responsibilities of political
governance. 2
Because the Constitutional Court cannot choose the issues presented for
review and, therefore, cannot coordinate its rulings with the government's
plans, the Court's decisions have caused some problems. From another
perspective, however, unexpected decisions of the Constitutional Court can be
seen as a catalyzer or an accelerator of legal development. For example, the
Court reviewed a regulation obligating individuals to present their personal
identification number (PIN) to state authorities upon request.' 3 It found that
the regulation as implemented violated individual rights, because state
authorities frequently and arbitrarily demanded citizens to produce their PIN.
The Court held the regulation unconstitutional for failing to specify the
objective of such requests and for not otherwise adequately securing individual
rights.'" This decision set in motion long overdue legislation on data protec-
tion.' 5 Similarly, a Court decision induced Parliament to extend the scope of
judicial review to all administrative decisions. 6 Another decision, however,
which declared unconstitutional an extraordinary procedure used to appeal
decisions to the High Court of Justice,17 prompted the legislature to introduce
a new form of extraordinary appeal, although ideally it should have led to a
reorganization of the court system.
B. Other Courts
The relationship between the Constitutional Court and other courts is also
uncertain. As previously noted, anyone can submit a petition for abstract
judicial review of a law or regulation. When an individual petitions the Court
with a fact-based complaint - claiming that the law or regulation applied to
her case violates one of her basic constitutional rights - the Court can issue
whatever legal remedies appropriate and quash the lower court's decision in
order to open the way for a new lawsuit." Just as Parliament has found it
difficult to accept judicial review of its laws, some judges of the ordinary
courts think that the Constitutional Court is meddling with their jurisdiction.
Had the LCC provided the Court with jurisdiction only over "constitutional
complaints" in the classical sense (i.e., authority to provide legal remedies
against violations of constitutional rights by judicial or governmental
decisions), its powers over ordinary courts would be less controversial.
Nevertheless, the Court has been able to exercise a significant amount of
12. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1991, 1991/31 ABH. 136, 138-39.
13. See Judgment of Apr. 13, 1991, 1991/15 ABH. 440, 443.
14. Id.
15. Law No. 63 of 1992 on Protection of Personal Data and Disclosure of Data of Public Interest.
16. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1990, 1990/32 ABH. 145.
17. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1992, 1992/9 ABH. 59, 68-69.
18. Judgment of Nov. 8, 1991, 1991/57 ABH. 272.
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control over the lower courts and the government by using fact-based
complaints to review laws in their entirety rather than simply their applica-
tions in specific cases. It may thus strike down an entire law (instead of
holding its application invalid) when the interpretation of the lower court or
agency is unconstitutional.19 The Court has also started to issue binding
interpretations of certain laws before lower courts have had an opportunity to
rule on them.2"
C. Public Opinion
Just as the Court's position in the overall structure of government is
somewhat ambiguous, its place in a representative democracy has been
questioned. A number of the Court's decisions have been contrary to public
opinion. For example, the Court held a law establishing the death penalty
unconstitutional, although the vast majority of the Hungarian population view
this punishment as acceptable and necessary.21 Many observers expected the
Constitutional Court to strike down the Law Concerning the Compensation for
Expropriated and Nationalized Property' (Compensation Law) given the
widespread public support for complete restitution to former property
owners.' The Court, however, did not mandate restitution or any other form
of privatization. Rather, it focused on the constitutionality of the specific
solution chosen by the legislature.24 In another case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a law permitting the government to prosecute certain
crimes that had not been prosecuted previously for political reasons, and that
were then technically barred by the statute of limitations.' Despite consider-
able public outcry, the Court found that the government could not prosecute
the crimes. The Court, like similar institutions in other countries, strives not
to be swayed by public opinion. Its position, however, is a precarious one. In
a new democracy, one may expect the majority's opinion to rule. Some
citizens may have difficulty reconciling this majoritarian vision of democracy
with the significant authority of a counter-majoritarian body,26 albeit one
whose members are elected by Parliament.
19. E.g., id.
20. Judgment of June 11, 1993, Alkotmdnybirosgg Hatdrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 199375
MK. 4134.
21. According to a sociological survey, only three percent of the population objects to capital
punishment in Hungary. Saj6 Andrds, Lakossdgi ndzeteka banterjogrdl [Popular Views on Criminal Law],
26 ALLAM-ts JOGTuDoMANY 527, 532 (1983).
22. Act 25 of 1991 on Compensation.
23. See generally Peter Paczolay, Judicial Review of the Compensation Law in Hungary, 13 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 806 (1992).
24. Judgment of Mar. 12, 1993, Alkotm~inybirosig Hatdrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1993/29
MK. 1567, 1569.
25. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77, 82.
26. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF PoLrrics 16 (2d ed. 1986).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND DOCTRINES
Hungary understandably lacks polished constitutional theories and
doctrines. The Court must make up for forty years lost during Communist
rule. From its first cases, the Court has required that the government
demonstrate a compelling state interest and a proportional relationship between
means and ends as preconditions to any limitations on constitutional rights. It
has introduced the concept of Wesensgehalt, or "the core of a right," which
stands for the principle that the essential content of a constitutional right
cannot be limited by law.27 The Court has also set forth principles for
interpreting the equality provisions of the Constitution.28 The Court has
applied several of Ronald Dworkin's theories,29 first as a statement of basic
principles, then as a detailed test for the constitutionality of discriminatory
legislation.3
27. I originally introduced the concept of Wesensgehalt in a dissenting opinion in Judgment of Feb.
18, 1990, 1990/2 ABH. 18, 23 (S61yom, Pres., dissenting). The Court adopted it after the Constitution
was amended in June 1990 to incorporate the concept. For example, the Court overturned a law requiring
leaders of political parties and social organizations to declare their property:
The legislator, when extending the duty to make a declaration of property to persons beyond
those holding state posts, limited, without a compelling reason, the rights ensured by Section
59 of the Constitution and thereby imposed restrictions on the essential contents of a
fundamental right. On the other hand, the provision does not meet with the proportionality
requirements for the norms limiting the fundamental right ... in the interest of achieving the
purpose. In enacting a limitation, the legislator is bound to employ the most moderate means
suitable for reaching the specified purpose. If the limitation adopted is unsuitable to achieve
the purpose, the violation of a fundamental right may be established.
Judgment of Oct. 4, 1990, 1990/20 ABH. 69, 71 (unofficial translation on file with author).
According to the Court, Wesensgehalt is violated when there is no "compelling and proportional'
reason to limit a constitutional right. The Hungarian Constitutional Court considers only the right to life
and human dignity unrestricted. This view was first formulated in my concurring opinion in a death
penalty case:
Article 8 of the Constitution confines the limitability of fundamental rights. It withdraws from
the outset their "essential contents" from the control of the legislature (i.e., the State), and it
forbids the suspension or curtailment of the exercise of the most important fundamental rights
even in times of emergency, national crises or extreme danger. But the rights to life and
human dignity are conceptually unlimitable, and man may be deprived of those completely and
once and for all (i.e., no distinction may be drawn between the part that may be limited and
the "essential contents'). The right to life and human dignity is the essential content itself.
Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, 1990/23 ABH. 88, 106 (S61yom, Pres., concurring) (unofficial translation on
file with author). The Court reiterated this view in an abortion case:
The right to human dignity means that the individual possesses an inviolable core of autonomy
and self-determination beyond the reach of all others, whereby, according to the classical
formulation, the human being remains a subject, not amenable to transformation into an
instrument or object.... Dignity is a quality conterminous with human existence, a quality
which is indivisible and cannot be limited, hence appertaining equally to every human being,
Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. 297, 308-09 (unofficial translation on file with author).
28. A MAGYAR K6zTARSASAG ALKoTMANYA [Constitution] art. 57(1) ("fE]veryone shall be equal
before the law. . . ."); 70/A(1) ('The Republic of Hungary shall ensure human and civil rights for
everyone within its territory without discrimination of any kind, such as upon race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or upon any other grounds.").
29. See generally RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD M. DWORIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
30. Judgment of Apr. 25, 1990, 1990/9 ABH. 46, 48-49 (unofficial translation on file with author);
Judgment of Oct. 4, 1990, 1990/21 ABH. 71, 75, 78 (unofficial translation on file with author).
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The Constitutional Court has developed an extensive interpretation of the
content of the right to human dignity." The Court has construed this right
as a "source right," or a "constitutional right that the Constitutional Court as
well as ordinary courts can call upon in a subsidiary fashion in the interest of
protecting individual autonomy in every case where none of the concrete
rights explicitly named in the Constitution are applicable in the given
circumstances."32 In the death penalty case, and, even more so in the
abortion case, the Court explained the right to human dignity in terms of its
interaction with the right to life and the right of legal capacity. 3 In these
opinions, the Constitutional Court held that the rights to dignity and to life are
absolute, because they ascertained that these rights are conceptually borderless
and that their denial is conceptually arbitrary.
The Court's decisions on privacy and abortion illustrate how the Court
seeks to strike a balance between the protection of fundamental rights and the
practical limits on its own power. For example, the Court recognized a right
to protection of personal data and thereby induced Parliament to enact data
protection legislation. In a similar case now pending, the Court has the
opportunity to consider the right to free access to information34 and to set a
direction for future legislation about freedom of information and public access
to governmental files.
In the abortion case, s the Court declared a ministerial decree regulating
abortion unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Specifically, it ruled that a
fundamental right cannot be regulated through non-statutory means.36 The
Court, however, did not limit its discussion to this aspect of the case. It noted
that the constitutionality of regulating abortion turns on whether the embryo
is human in the legal sense - that is, whether the embryo is a legal
subject. 7 The Court then noted that Parliament has a duty to define the term
"human." '38 The relevant inquiry is whether the embryo can have funda-
mental rights at all. Parliament's decision is constrained only in that it cannot
narrow the present legal definition of the human being. If the legislature
declares the embryo a legal subject, pregnancy could be terminated only to
save the mother's life. If the legislature does not deem the embryo a legal
31. A MAGYAR K6zTAI SASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54(1) ("[E]veryone has the inherent
right to life and human dignity, of which no one shall be arbitrarily deprived.").
32. Judgment of Apr. 23, 1990, 1990/8 ABH. 32, 45 (author's translation).
33. See A MAGYAR K6ZTARSAsAG ALKoTMMNYA [Constitution] art. 54(1); id. art 56 ("[E]very human
being shall have legal capacity."); Judgment of Oct. 31, 1990, 1990/23 ABH. 88, 92 (death penalty case);
id. at 103-07 (S61yom, Pres., concurring); Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991164 ABH. 293, 308 (unofficial
translation on file with author) (abortion case).
34. See A MAOYAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 61(1) ("[E]veryone shall be
entitled to freely express one's opinion as well as to have access to and disseminate data of public
interests.").
35. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. at 293.
36. Id. at 306. The Court overturned Minister of Health Decree No. 15 (1988) (regulating abortion).
37. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. at 309-13.
38. Id. at 312.
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 223
subject, the Court could weigh the mother's right to control her body39
against the state's duty to protect human life.4" Since such a balance must be
struck, neither a complete prohibition of abortion nor a complete freedom of
abortion would be constitutional.41
IV. DimcULTImS oF TRANSITION
The Constitutional Court has faced a number of complicated issues arising
from the transition from a non-democratic to a democratic society. Most of
these issues first surfaced in 1991, after the Constitutional Court had spent a
year developing its procedures and building its legitimacy. Constitutional
problems arose primarily in four areas: (1) the regulation of property
relations, (2) the prosecution of politically motivated crimes committed during
the previous regime, (3) the separation of powers and federalism, and (4)
legal procedure and due process.
A. Property Relations
The Constitutional Court has played a major role in harmonizing the legal
and political aspects of the new system of property. Under Communism, more
than ninety percent of industrial and commercial enterprises was state-owned.
The political and economic reorganization of the 1980s was intended to create
a market economy based on private property. Privatization is a constitutional
goal: the Preamble refers to the "social market economy"'4 and Article 4
grants public and private property equal rank in a market economy.43
One important issue was whether private property that was nationalized
in the 1940s and 1950s should be returned to its original owners or whether
those owners should be compensated. Those who favored the latter approach
disagreed on whether compensation should be limited to property loss or
whether it should include additional payments to those who were persecuted
by the old regime. The largest party of the ruling coalition, the Hungarian
39. The Court held that "even the very limited restrictions on the availability of abortion imposed by
existing regulations directly and substantially affect the mother's right to self-determination... [which]
is one aspect of the general individual right ... as espoused by Article 54(1) of the Constitution."
Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. at 301.
40. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKoTMANYA [Constitution] art. 54(1) ("[E]veryone has the inherent
right to life .... ."); id. art. 8(1) ("The Republic of Hungary recognizes the inviolable and inalienable
fundamental human rights; the observance and the protection of these shall be a primary duty of the
State.").
41. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1991, 1991/64 ABH. at 316 ("The state has a duty to protect human life
from the moment of its inception and hence the right to self-determination cannot be dispositive even in
the earliest stages of the pregnancy.").
42. A MAGYAR K0ZTARsASAG ALKOTMkYA [Constitution] pmbl. ("In order to facilitate a peaceful
political transition to a constitutional state implementing a multiparty system, parliamentary democracy and
social market economy ... .").
43. Id. art. 9(1) ("The economy of Hungary is a market economy where public and private ownership
shall enjoy equal rights and equal protection.").
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Democratic Forum, wanted a policy of partial monetary compensation for
property as well as certain additional damages for personal suffering. The
Smallholders Party (representing former peasant landowners) sought the actual
return of land, which would have required that land of agricultural coopera-
tives be expropriated without compensation. The ruling coalition drafted a bill
that would have provided all those who had lost land with their original or
similar plots, and all those who had lost personal property with payment. To
determine the bill's constitutionality, the Prime Minister asked the Court to
interpret the Constitution's provisions relating to equality and to the right of
property.
The Court found that a scheme to compensate former real property
owners and personal property owners by such significantly different means,
would, in the absence of a compelling reason for the discrimination, violate
the Constitution's equality provision.' Furthermore, for the government to
distribute governmental largess to some individuals (i.e., former property
owners) and not others, it must demonstrate that the discrimination is
necessary for fair competition in the marketplace.4' The Court also declared
that the Constitution protects the property of agricultural cooperatives, and
that this property cannot be taken away without prompt and complete
compensation.46
The Court disregarded the fact that the cooperatives' property rights had
arisen through forced collectivization. It held that the Constitution protects
property acquired through measures that were legal at the time, and that
settled legal relationships must be respected and accepted.47 The Court's
position on these questions reflects an acknowledgement of the complexity of
compensation and restoration. Property may have changed hands a number of
times between 1939 and 1989, sometimes through now-discredited govern-
mental acts. For example, Germany, during its World War II occupation of
Hungary, expropriated the property of Jews. After the war, the Hungarian
government expropriated property in the hands of ethnic Germans and
redistributed it to ethnic Hungarian refugees.48 These lands were subse-
quently nationalized under Communist rule. In recent years the government
has sold such nationalized property to private individuals. The question thus
arises, if property is to revert to its former owner, to whom should it be
restored?
The Compensation Law ultimately provided for partial compensation to
those who were "unjustly" deprived of private property rather than for a direct
44. Judgment of June 3, 1991, 1991/28 ABH. 88, 89-95, 98-101; see also supra note 28 (equality
provisions); Klingsberg, supra note 3, at 84, 85 n.104.
45. Judgment of Oct. 4, 1990, 1990/21 ABH. 73, 79.
46. Id. at 79-82.
47. Judgment of June 3, 1991, 1991/28 ABH. at 105-08.
48. See Klingsberg, supra note 3, at 105 & nn. 158-60.
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restoration of the property itself.49 Compensation would have taken the form
of options to purchase privatized government property, including land owned
by agricultural cooperatives. Under this scheme, agricultural cooperatives
would have been forced to sell land at an extremely low price set by law. The
cooperatives viewed this obligation as expropriation and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional.
The Constitutional Court saw the problem within the broader framework
of the transformation of property ownership. To effect this transformation, the
government must change the former, privileged "social property" (property
of the state and of cooperatives) into private property and other equivalent
forms of property (e.g., property of local communities). The Court also
considered drafts of laws that would transfer such property as state-owned
apartments and real estate free of change to municipalities and distribute the
property of agricultural cooperatives to its members. It found that the
Constitution does not bar the government from placing burdens on those who
acquire the former "social property" free of charge, including the agricultural
cooperatives' who challenged the Compensation Law. These burdens can arise
either from the circumstances of the creation of the social property or from
the duties that arise from the new Constitution.
The question then remained, should the former owners not have a right
to the restoration of their property or to full compensation? The Constitutional
Court scrutinized the Nationalization Law of 1948-52 and declared it
unconstitutional on the ground that abolishing private property is not a
collective goal under the current Constitution. Although the Nationalization
Law indicated that additional laws would control the question of compensa-
tion, these laws were never promulgated. The Court therefore left open the
possibility that Parliament would enact this compensation legislation.
Because the Court limited its review to whether the particular solution
chosen by Parliament was constitutional, the Court could not evaluate the
broader issue of the constitutionality of restoration. As it considered the
validity of the Compensation Law, the Court made clear that a solution to the
property problem, despite the exceptional nature of that problem, had to be
found within the boundaries of the Constitution.
B. Prosecution of Politically Motivated Crimes and GeneralLegal Procedure
The prosecution of acts of murder, manslaughter, and high treason
committed between 1944 and 1990 has been a particularly controversial issue
for the Court. For political reasons, some of these crimes were not prosecuted
under the old regime, and the applicable statutes of limitations have long since
expired. Parliament enacted a law that would have reset statutes of limitations,
49. Act 25 of 1991 on Compensation.
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and the President referred it to the Court for pre-enactment review.50 The
Court thus squarely confronted the question of whether Parliament could take
action potentially inconsistent with the rule of law for the sake of prosecuting
individuals affiliated with the old regime. It held unconstitutional attempts to
punish criminal deeds already barred by a statute of limitations, attempts to
extend the statute of limitations for the prosecution of crimes where the statute
of limitations had not yet expired, and attempts to retroactively introduce new
causes of action to bypass statutes of limitations. In effect, the Court's holding
forestalls the passage of any retroactive criminal laws."'
This ruling, however, did not end the Court's confrontation with
Parliament over the issue of political crimes. In March 1992, Parliament
passed an authoritative resolution on the interpretation of statutes of
limitations, which excluded the period between 1944 and 1989 from such
statutes of limitations. The Court declared the regulation unconstitutional on
both procedural and substantive grounds. Since an authoritative parliamentary
resolution does not qualify as a legislative act, it cannot regulate citizens'
basic rights, 2 and it violates the principles of legality, legal certainty, and
judicial independence. Substantively, the Court found the resolution unconsti-
tutional because it sought to make retroactive criminal prosecution possible.'3
In response to this ruling, Parliament enacted a bill in February 1993
amending the Criminal Procedural Act of 1973. By doing so, Parliament
sought to oblige public prosecutors to bring charges in certain cases, even if
trial would be barred by a statute of limitations. The President of the Republic
did not sign the bill but turned to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary
ruling on the bill's constitutionality. The Court rejected the bill, based on the
same arguments used in the decision to strike down Parliament's interpretive
resolution, 4 stating that the bill violated the principles of the rule of law,
legality, and legal certainty.' Finally, in October 1993, on the President's
motion, the Court reviewed a bill passed by Parliament concerning crimes
committed during the 1956 revolution. The Court held that crimes defined by
international law can be prosecuted without regard to domestic laws, including
statutes of limitations.56
These opinions have had a major impact on the debate over whether
major transitions in Hungarian society can and should be accomplished strictly
within the framework of the rule of law. The Court chose the appropriate
50. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77, 82.
51. Id. at 88.
52. A MAGYAR KOZTARsAsAG ALKOTmANYA [Constitution] art 8(2).
53. Judgment of June 30, 1993, Alkotminybirosig Hatrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1993/85
MK. 4595.
54. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77.
55. Judgment of June 30, 1993, Alkotm~nybiros~g Hatdrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1993/85
MK. 4600.
56. Judgment of Oct. 13, 1993, AlkotmAnybirosAg HatArozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1993/147
MK. 8793.
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course. A full transformation cannot take place through means inconsistent
with the Constitution. The Court thus held that the rule of law must be
respected under all circumstances.
The Court's approach can be questioned on two grounds. First, why
should legal relationships that developed under unconstitutional legal norms
be preserved? The Constitutional Court has answered simply that settled legal
relationships are generally unaffected by a declaration that the underlying legal
norms are invalid."8 Second, does Hungary's special historical situation
weigh in favor of a more flexible application of the rule of law? According
to the Court, while the historical situation may be important, it cannot justify
violations of the underlying guarantee of the rule of law. 59 A state governed
by the rule of law cannot be realized through means incompatible with that
rule of law. In cases of conflict, the Court will place legal stability, which is
based on objective and formal principles, ahead of substantive justice, which
is partial and subjective.
In addition to prosecuting past political crimes, an important aspect of
creating a state based on the rule of law is establishing due process guarantees
consistent with the Constitution and international accords. In the past year
alone, the Court invalidated limitations on a defendant's rights in military
criminal trials;6  invalidated a regulation that based compensation for
unlawful detention upon estimates by the Justice Minister;61 and expanded
the availability of rights of appeal.62 The Court also invalidated many civil
law norms including procedural rules that had favored the government and its
public enterprises. Still, the Court upheld many rules that were alleged to be
infringements of various personal rights for the sake of legal stability and
finality. 63
57. "However, the basic guarantees of Rechtsstaat cannot be set aside by reference to historical
situations and the Rechtsstaat's demand for justice. A state under the rule of law cannot be created by
undermining the rule of law. The certainty of the law based on formal and objective principles is more
important than the necessarily partial and subjective justice." Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH.
at 82.
58. Id. at 81-82. According to the general rule set by Law No. 32, the annulment of a legal provision
shall effect neither the legal relationships that developed prior to the publication of the decision nor the
rights and duties derived from them. Law No. 32, supra note 1, art. 43(2); see also Judgment of Feb. 25,
1992, 1992/10 ABH. 72, 74-75 (finding Article 43 constitutional). This rule is subject to certain exceptions
in criminal procedures. Law No. 32, supra, art. 43(3). The Court also has discretion to declare a provision
unconstitutional with ex tunc (retroactive) effect if retroactivity would be justified by a particularly
important interest of legal certainty or of the person who initiated the procedure. Id. art. 43(4). The Court,
however, declined to exercise this discretion to give retroactive effect to nationalization laws: "[Tihe
annulment of such legal rules with retroactive effect not only would lack remedy of the legal damages of
the former owners, but would inevitably cause further legal damages in mass proportions. In view of all
this, the Constitutional Court found that the exceptional authorization contained in section 4 of Article 43
of the Act on the Constitutional Court is not applicable in the present case." Judgment of May 20, 1991,
1991/27 ABH. 73, 80 (unofficial translation on file with author).
59. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. at 82-83.
60. Judgment of May 18, 1991, 1991/25 ABH. 414, 414-18.
61. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1991, 1991166 ABH. 342, 347-50.
62. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1992, 1992/5 ABH. 27; Judgment of Oct. 27, 1992, 1992/52 ABH. 257.
63. See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 10, 1991, 1991/46 ABH. 211, 213; Judgment of Mar. 25, 1992,
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C. Separation of Powers and Federalism
Throughout the political transformation, the role and legal position of the
President of the Republic was the topic of intense political debate. This
controversy focused on whether Hungary should be a parliamentary or a
presidential republic. Ultimately, the Constitution enshrined a parliamentary
system and thereby defined the limits of the presidency.64 Nevertheless, the
Constitutional Court has on occasion had to address the question of the
President's legal position.
The most important decision pertaining to separation of powers arose
from a petition by the Minister of Defense.65 The Constitution declares that
the President of the Republic is commander in chief of the armed forces.66
A separate article of the Constitution, however, provides that "only" Parlia-
ment, the President, the National Defense Council, and the responsible
minister "shall have the power, within the limits determined by the Constitu-
tion and a separate Act, to command the armed forces." '67 The Court was
called upon to interpret constitutional provisions regarding presidential control
of the armed forces, as well as the President's power of appointment. The
Constitutional Court held that the President, as commander in chief, did not
hold the power to command. Rather, the President had the power to appoint
a commander, subject to the Prime Minister's endorsement."
The Court's long and detailed opinion is significant for more than its
resolution of the specific issues at hand. The Court attempted to integrate
scattered provisions on separation of powers into a coherent constitutional
structure. It also classified different kinds of presidential decisions and
enumerated the range of circumstances in which the President's rejection of
a cabinet nominee for Commander in Chief would be constitutional.69 The
Court interpreted the Constitution's provisions on the structure of the state
quite rigidly, in marked contrast to its broader construction of basic individual
rights.
The Constitutional Court has also decided separation of powers issues
relating to the judiciary. Under Hungarian law, the Minister of Justice has the
power to appoint the presidents of the various courts. The 1991 amendment
of the Judiciary Act introduced new, self-governing institutions (judicial
councils) for the judiciary, but did not abrogate the competencies of the
Minister. When the act was challenged, the Court upheld the validity of the
law but set forth specific constitutional requirements for appointments by the
1992113 ABH. 95.
64. A MAGYAR K6zTARsAsAG ALKoTmANYA [Constitution] art. 30/A.
65. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1991, 1991/48 ABH. 217.
66. A MAGYAR K6zTARsAsAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 29(2).
67. Id. art. 40/1B(3).
68. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1991, 1991148 ABH. at 229.
69. Id. at 232-36.
1994]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19: 223
Minister of Justice: because the judiciary shares the appointment power with
the executive branch, any appointment by the Minister must be supported by
at least fifty percent of the judges already on the bench in that court.70
In addition to questions about the horizontal distribution of power among
branches of the national government, the Court has faced questions about the
vertical distribution of power between the national and local governments.
Because the new Constitution explicitly grants autonomy to local communi-
ties,7 ' many problems in demarcation and jurisdiction have arisen.72 The
Court has the authority to supervise municipal bylaws and local referenda, and
it has, through case law, largely defined municipalities' room for action,
particularly the degree to which local ordinances can deviate from national
regulations.' a Nonetheless, the Court believes that the newly created
administrative courts should supervise municipal bylaws and referenda, as the
large number of cases raising these issues would place a great burden on the
Constitutional Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Fortunate countries are blessed with time for organic development - time
in which the principles of basic rights can evolve through the interaction of
legal science and case law. Doctrines in such countries arise out of detailed
analysis in a series of cases. In contrast, a country attempting to form a
democratic government after a totalitarian regime does not have the benefits
of time. The new Hungarian Constitutional Court, for instance, was
confronted with momentous decisions shortly after its creation. Issues relating
to abortion, the death penalty, separation of powers, individual rights, and
property rights had to be resolved immediately.
70. JudgmentJune 11, 1993, AlkotmdnybirosdgHatrozatai [Constitutional Law Court], 1993/75 MK.
4134.
71. A MAGYAR KzTARsAsAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 42 ("The enfranchised citizens of the
communities, towns, of the capital city and its districts, as well as of the counties, shall be entitled to the
right of local self-government. The local self-government shall be the autonomous and democratic
administration of the local public affairs concerning the enfranchised citizens and the exercise of local
public authority in the interest of the population.").
72. Communal councils existed for forty years in Hungary but functioned only as "local organs of
the State."
73. Law No. 32, supra note 1, art. 1 ('The competence of the Court shall comprise the
following: ... 0 the elimination of a conflict in connection with the sphere of authority arising between
several State organs, a self-government and other State organs (bodies), or self-governments .... ); id.
art. 59(1) ("The general authority of supervision of legality shall extend to legal rules issued by the state
administrative organs of a lower level than the Government and to the local self-government and to other
legal means of the State control, as well as to the orders of general validity and to the individual decisions
made by these organs in the process of law-application."); Law No. 65 of 1990 on Local Governments,
art. 51. In one case, the Court overturned a local government's decree banning the sale of erotic and
pornographic goods. Since legislative acts already allowed the sale of such goods, the local government
was permitted to make only certain territorial restrictions. Judgment of Nov. 30, 1991, 1991/63 ABH.
470.
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The Court's decisions were made in an atmosphere characteristic of the
regimes that emerged out of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The new
regimes frequently attempted to incorporate idealized pre-communist
arrangements. When confronted with difficult questions, the government and
Parliament have tried to avoid unconventional solutions. The Court has
realized, however, that important cases need not be decided in a traditional
manner, and that the Court was not bound by the constitutional practice of
other state organs. Because the Court has enjoyed relative insulation from
certain political forces, it has been able to develop its own approach to the
interpretation and contextualization of constitutional rights.

